State of Utah v. Val Dean Gibson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Val Dean Gibson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Matthew D. Bates; Mark W. Baer; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General.
Randall K. Spencer; M. Brooke Wilkins; Fillmore Spencer; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gibson, No. 20050672 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5950
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050672-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDER IN THE 
TFIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
MATTHEW D. BATES (9861) 
MARK W. BAER (5440) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
RANDALL K. SPENCER Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
M. BROOKE WILKINS Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Fillmore Spencer LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY " 8 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050672-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDER IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
MATTHEW D. BATES (9861) 
MARK W. BAER (5440) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
RANDALL K. SPENCER Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
M. BROOKE WILKINS Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Fillmore Spencer LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RES JUDICATA DEFENSE IN HIS 
PLEA BARGAIN 8 
n. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY BETWEEN A CIVIL 
JUDGMENT AND CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 11 
A. Res judicata has two branches—claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion 12 
B. Res judicata does not apply because the State is not a privy of 
the victim 13 
1. Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, there is no 
privity between the State and the victim 14 
2. Under traditional privity tests, the State is not the victim's 
privy because it has its own legal right to require the 
defendant to pay restitution 16 
C. Res judicata does not apply in the instant case because the 
restitution order was based, in part, on criminal conduct not at 




Addendum A (Restitution Order) 
Addendum B (Statement in Advanced of Plea) 
Addendum C (Pleadings in the victim's civil case) 
Addendum D (Crime Victims Restitution Act) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Allen v. McCurry,449 U.S. 90,94 (1980) 12 
United States v. Montana, 440 U.S. 147,151 (1979) 19,20 
STATE CASES 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremoco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,f25,110 
P.3d678 passim 
Busch v. Busch, 2003 UT App 131,1 6, 71 P.3d 177 22 
Cook v. Hurst, 777 P.2d 1029,1038 (Utah 1989) 9 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,570 (Utah App. 1998) 8 
Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,117,16 P.3d 1214 2,22 
Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691 (Utah 1978) 13,14,17 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13,133, 73 P.3d 325 12,13 
State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602,606 (Or. 1981) 18 
State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5,6 (Utah App. 1993) 2 
State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96,117 n.4, 89 P.3d 185 1,8 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989) 8 
State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927,931 n.3 (Utah 1992) 10 
State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866,869 (Utah App. 1992) 18 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (West 2004) 9,17 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(l) (West 2004) 14,15,16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004) 1 
i i i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050672-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a criminal restitution order imposed in a non-first 
degree felony criminal case in the Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did defendant waive his res judicata defense to restitution by agreeing to 
pay restitution in his plea agreement? 
Standard of Review. This issue is raised by the appellee for the first time on 
appeal as an alternative ground to affirm the trial court. See State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT 
App 96, \ 17 n.4,89 P.3d 185. Thus, no standard of review applies. 
2. Does res judicata limit restitution in a criminal case to the amount obtained 
by the victim in a prior civil judgment? 
Standard of Review. This issue requires interpretation of a judicial doctrine— 
res judicata—and the interpretation a statute—the Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
Both are question of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. See State v. Garcia, 
866 P.2d 5,6 (Utah App. 1993) (interpreting restitution statute); Macris & Assoc, Inc. 
v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, % 17,16 P.3d 1214 (reviewing lower court's application 
of res judicata). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal concerns the Crime Victims Restitution Act, found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-101 through Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-601 (West Supp. 2005), attached 
as Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
Defendant has never denied embezzling $144,702.45 from Gomez 
Landscaping (R. 161-62; 430:12). He claimed only that the trial court could not 
order criminal restitution in that amount because the victim had already obtained a 
civil judgment against him for $59,000. Aplt. Br. at 4. 
1
 Defendant pled guilty, so the facts are taken from the pleadings and the 
preliminary hearing and restitution hearing transcripts. 
2 
The crime. Gomez contracted with defendant to do accounting for his 
landscaping business in 1999 (R. 429:131-32). Defendant agreed to provide payroll 
services, including cutting payroll checks and paying payroll taxes (R. 429:131-32). 
Each pay period, Gomez would write one check to defendant for payroll and taxes 
(R. 429:132). Defendant would then cut individual checks to each employee and 
send checks to the state and federal tax authorities (R. 429:132). 
Defendant performed these services as agreed in 1999 (R. 429:131-33). But in 
2000, defendant stopped making deposits with the federal and state tax authorities 
(R. 429:133). He continued to accept money from Gomez, but did not forward the 
tax payments (R. 429:133-34). Gomez did not discover defendant's embezzlement 
until 2001, when the tax authorities notified him of his failure to file (R. 429:133-34). 
The civil suit. On June 7, 2002, Gomez filed a civil complaint against 
defendant in the Utah Third District Court (R. 317-21, 361-65). Gomez alleged 
conversion and fraudulent conversion for embezzling his payroll taxes during the 
third and fourth quarters of 2001 (R. 318-19). He also claimed that defendant 
refused to turn over Gomez's tax records and refused to return the embezzled 
funds. Gomez asked for $59,000 in damages plus attorneys fees and punitive 
damages (R. 321). 
Forty-nine days later, on July 25,2002, Gomez moved for a default judgment 
against defendant (R. 322-26). The district court held a hearing on the motion, but 
3 
defendant failed to appear (R. 312). So the court entered a default judgment against 
him for $59,880.29, "plus all interest and additional penalties imposed by the IRS or 
the Utah Tax Commission/7 and punitive damages of $60,000 (R. 312-13). 
The criminal charges. Three months later, on November 15,2002, the State 
filed a criminal information against defendant (R. 1-6). The information alleged 
three counts of income tax evasion, one count of filing a false return, two counts of 
unlawful dealing by a fiduciary, two counts of communications fraud, and two 
counts of unlawful and unprofessional conduct (R. 1-4). The State later amended 
the information to include a racketeering charge (R. 148-54). The unlawful dealing 
charges alleged that defendant embezzled money from Gomez Landscaping in 2000 
and 2001 (R. 2-4,148-54). 
In July of 2004, the State and defendant reached a plea agreement. Defendant 
pled guilty to one count of tax evasion, one count of filing a false return, one count 
of unlawful dealing, one count of communications fraud, and one count of 
unprofessional conduct (R. 159-72). He also agreed "that criminal restitution for 
unpaid state taxes and for losses to private victims will be requested by the State 
and my be entered in this case for all years, not just the years on [sic] tax year(s) for 
which I am pleading" (R. 165). Defendant further agreed "that the State is seeking 
and/or may seek as criminal restitution, amounts not only for the counts for which I 
am entering pleas, but also for those counts which, in accordance with the 
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agreement are being dismissed, including restitution to all private individuals)'7 (R. 
165). He also acknowledged that "the State firmly believes as of the time of the 
entering of this Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or 
above $148,955" (R. 165). 
In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts (R. 
165). It also agreed to recommend probation and "a fine in the low range of that 
applicable by law" (R. 166). 
After his plea, defendant retained new counsel and moved unsuccessfully to 
withdraw his plea (R. 194-95,204-11,266-67). On December 13,2004, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to suspended prison terms and three years probation, 
including sixty days in jail (R. 279-83). Defendant did not appeal his conviction. A 
month later, the State filed a Notice of Restitution Amounts that requested 
$148,955.63 restitution for Clark Gomez (R. 300). Defendant requested a restitution 
hearing (R. 305). 
At the restitution hearing, defendant did not dispute the restitution amount; 
rather, he claimed res judicata (R. 430:10-11). Specifically, he asserted that the 
restitution statute defined "pecuniary damages" as those damages that the 
defendant could recover in a civil suit against the defendant (R. 430:11). Since 
Gomez had already obtained a civil judgment against him for conversion, defendant 
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claimed that res judicata precluded the State from relitigating the issue of damages 
(R. 430:12). 
The State responded that Gomez's civil complaint and judgment was limited 
to the third and fourth quarter of 2001 and that Gomez had since discovered 
additional losses (R. 430:15-16). The court agreed with the State and entered a 
restitution order for $144,702.45 (R. 430:20-21). It required, however, that payments 
made on Gomez's civil judgment be credited against the restitution judgment (R. 
430:21-22). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court from that order 
(R. 419).2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a trial court from 
ordering restitution in an amount greater than a victim's prior civil judgment 
against the defendant. Res judicata is an affirmative defense, however, that may be 
waived. In this case, defendant waived res judicata by agreeing in his plea bargain 
to pay restitution "for all years" and for all counts, including the dismissed counts. 
Even if defendant had not waived a res judicata defense, his claim would fail 
on its merits. Res judicata requires privity between the party to the first litigation 
2
 The district court's restitution order was erroneously omitted from the 
record. The parties by stipulation supplemented the record with a signed copy of 
the order. See Order of March 28, 2006, Case No. 20050672-CA, attached as 
Addendum A. 
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and the party in the second litigation. But under the Crime Victim's Restitution Act, 
the State and the victim are not in privity. The victim has an independent right to 
sue the defendant for damages, regardless of the outcome of the criminal action. 
Additionally, the State and the victim are not privies under traditional 
principles of privity because the State is not asserting the same legal right as the 
victim. The States has a right to seek restitution for remedial and rehabilitative 
purposes that is independent of the victim's right to sue the defendant civilly. 
Furthermore, the issue decided by the civil litigation was not the same as the 
issue in the criminal restitution. Clark Gomez brought a conversion claim for only 
the third and fourth quarters of 2001. The State sought restitution for the entirety of 
defendant's criminal conduct against Gomez for the years 2000 and 2001. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RES JUDICATA DEFENSE IN HIS 
PLEA BARGAIN 
Defendant asserts that res judicata precludes the trial court from imposing 
restitution in an amount greater than the civil judgment Gomez obtained. But 
defendant affirmatively waived his res judicata defense in his plea bargain with the 
State.3 
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives a host of claims, defenses, and rights. 
See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah App. 1998) (stating that 
"nonjurisdictional issues may be waived by a guilty plea"). "The general rule 
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading 
guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the 
crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged 
pre-plea constitutional violations/7 State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989) 
see also James, 965 P.2d at 572-73 (holding that guilty plea waived statute of 
limitations defense). 
Additionally, in a plea agreement, both the State and the defendant may 
waive other rights and claims or assume additional obligations that are not 
3
 The State did not raise waiver at the restitution hearing. But this Court may 
affirm the judgment below on any ground apparent in the record. See State v. 
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 ,117 n.4, 89 P.3d 185. 
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necessarily waived or assumed by a guilty plea. For example, a defendant may 
plead guilty to a crime for which he could not have been convicted to obtain a lesser 
sentence. See Cook v. Hurst, 777 P.2d 1029,1038 (Utah 1989) (upholding guilty plea 
for aggravated sexual abuse of a child when defendant did not occupy special 
position of trust, an element of that offense). Or a defendant may agree to testify 
against a co-defendant or cooperate in investigating other offenses. He may also 
agree to pay restitution for conduct for which he was not criminally charged. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (West 2004). The State, on the other hand, might 
agree to drop certain charges, extend immunity for certain offenses or time periods, 
or agree to make certain recommendations at sentencing. 
In fact, a plea agreement is not unlike a civil settlement agreement. 
Regardless of the evidence, the charges filed, or the defenses available, the State and 
the defendant are free to fashion a settlement that expedites resolution of the 
criminal charges without a trial. In fashioning such an agreement, the parties may 
negotiate away claims and defenses that otherwise would have been available had 
they proceeded to trial. 
Like any other non-jurisdictional claim or defense, res judicata is waivable. 
Under the rules of civil procedure, a res judicata claim is waived unless it is pleaded 
in the defendant's answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing res judicata as an 
affirmative defense); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (stating that parties waive all defenses not 
9 
raised in answer). Additionally, the supreme court has stated that res judicata "is an 
affirmative defense in both criminal and civil cases and therefore waivable." State v. 
Perank, 858 P.2d 927,931 n.3 (Utah 1992). 
In the instant case, the parties settled defendant's criminal charges through a 
plea agreement. In that agreement, the State dismissed six of the eleven charges 
pending against defendant, including five second degree felonies (R. 148-54,159-60, 
165). It also agreed not file any additional criminal tax charges for crimes occurring 
before the date of the plea (R. 165). The State further committed to recommend to 
the sentencing court that defendant receive probation and a fine "in the low range of 
that applicable by law" (R. 166). 
In exchange for the State's concessions, defendant pled guilty to the 
remaining five charges (R. 159-60). He also agreed that "criminal restitution for 
unpaid state taxes and for losses to private victims will be requested by the State 
and may be entered in this case for all years, not just the years on [sic] tax year(s) for 
which [he] [was] pleading" (R. 165). He further agreed that the State "may seek as 
criminal restitution amounts not only for the counts for which [he] [was] entering 
pleas, but also for those counts which, in accordance with this agreement are being 
dismissed, including restitution to all private individual(s)" (R. 165). Lastly, 
defendant understood that "the State firmly believes as of the time of the entering of 
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this Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or above $148,955" 
(R. 165). 
Defendant now seeks to undo that agreement and assert a res judicata defense 
to the State's restitution claim. But defendant waived that defense when he agreed 
that the court could impose restitution for all years and all charges, including 
dismissed charges (R. 165). Moreover, rescinding the agreement at this stage would 
unfairly prejudice the State. The State agreed to drop more than half the charges 
and to give defendant a favorable recommendation at sentencing in exchange for his 
promise to fully recompense the victim of his criminal conduct. But the State can no 
longer revoke its sentencing recommendation, nor can it reinstate the dismissed 
charges. Allowing a res judicata defense would thus cost the State the benefit of its 
bargain. 
Accordingly, this Court should uphold the terms of the plea agreement, hold 
that defendant waived his res judicata defense in his plea bargain, and affirm the 
trial court's restitution order. 
II. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY BETWEEN A CIVIL 
JUDGMENT AND CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
Even if defendant had not waived his res judicata claim in the plea agreement, 
his claim would still fail because res judicata does not apply to the government at a 
criminal restitution hearing. 
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A. Res judicata has two branches—claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. 
Res judicata is a general term that describes the preclusive effect a judgment 
has on the parties. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremoco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 
125,110 P.3d 678. Under res judicata, a final judgment prevents the parties or their 
privies from relitigating the same claims or the same issues that were resolved by 
that judgment. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f 33, 73 P.3d 325. Res 
judicata thus has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.4 Id. 
"Generally, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Id. at f 34 (citations and 
quotations omitted). The party asserting claim preclusion as a defense must 
establish three elements: (1) that both cases involve the same parties or their privies; 
(2) that the allegedly barred claim was presented in the first case or could and 
should have been presented in the first case; and (3) that the first case resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. Id. 
4
 Traditionally, res judicata referred only to claim preclusion, and issue 
preclusion was known as collateral estoppel. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94 
(1980) More commonly today, the term "res judicata" is used to generally describe 
the preclusive effect a judgment has on the parties and includes both claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. See Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, ^  25. This brief uses "res 
judicata" in that sense. 
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Issue preclusion, on the other hand, may arise from a different cause of action 
and bars only relitigation of a particular issue. Id. at % 35. The party asserting issue 
preclusion as a defense must establish four elements: (1) that both cases involve the 
same parties or their privies; (2) that the issue decided in the first case is identical to 
the issue in the second case; (3) that the issue in the first case was completely, fully, 
and fairly litigated; and (4) that the first case resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. Id. 
Defendant claims that both claim preclusion and issue preclusion apply to the 
State's request for restitution. But as explained below, neither branch of res judicata 
applies to the government in a restitution hearing. 
B. Res judicata does not apply because the State is not a privy of 
the victim. 
Both branches of res judicata require that the prior and subsequent cases 
involve the same parties or their privies. The State was not a party to Gomez's civil 
lawsuit against defendant, nor is Gomez a party to the criminal case against 
defendant. Thus defendant can only assert res judicata if the State is in privity with 
Gomez. 
A party is in privity with another for purposes of res judicata when that party 
is "so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right." 
Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691 (Utah 1978). Traditionally, privity occurs in "a 
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mutual or successive relationship to rights in property/ ' id., or when a judgment is 
obtained by one legally appointed to represent another, such as a guardian or 
trustee, see Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ 29. 
The State is not the privy of a crime victim for two reasons. First, under the 
Crime Victims Restitution Act, there is no privity between the victim and State. 
Second, when traditional principles of privity are applied, it is clear that the victim 
and the State each have their own legal right to require the defendant to pay 
restitution. Thus they enjoy no privity. 
1. Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, there is no privity 
between the State and the victim. 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act makes clear that the legislature did not 
intend for there to be privity between the State and the victim. Section 403(1) of the 
Act describes the victim's right to seek a separate civil judgment against the 
defendant and the relationship between that civil judgment and the restitution 
order. It is, essentially, the "res judicata" section of the Act: 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair 
the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue 
and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence 
that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under 
this part may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the 
facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the 
court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim 
against any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(l) (West 2004). 
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Section 403(1) establishes three principles: (1) criminal restitution proceedings 
do not limit the victim's right to recover civilly; (2) the criminal restitution order 
may not be entered as evidence in the victim's civil action; and (3) any restitution 
paid must be credited against the victim's civil judgment. Thus, under section 
403(1), a crime victim's damages may be litigated twice. Moreover, the victim is not 
bound in any way by the criminal restitution proceedings. 
If the victim can litigate his damages independently from the criminal 
restitution proceedings, the victim cannot be a privy of the State. Conversely, the 
State must not be a privy of the victim. Res judicata does not therefore apply. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the Crime Victim's Restitution Act ("the 
Act") should not be used to give a crime victim another opportunity litigate the 
question of damages. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. He claims under section 403(2) of the Act that 
a restitution order is "res judicata in any subsequent civil action" and that the 
"converse must also be true." Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant misinterprets that section. 
Section 403(2) concerns the preclusive effect of a criminal conviction, not 
restitution. It states, "If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of 
a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively 
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(2). By the plain language of section 403(2), defendant's 
conviction is res judicata as to the question of liability, not damages. That is, section 
15 
403(2) estops a defendant from relitigating the question of liability when that 
question is "conclusively determined" by the criminal trial. Id. 
As explained above, section 403(1), not 403(2), governs the relationship 
between criminal restitution and the victim's civil lawsuit. According to that 
section, the Act does not "limit or impair the right of a person injured by a 
defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a 
civil action." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(l) (West 2004). Barring further recovery 
in a civil action on res judicata grounds would "limit or impair" the victim's right to 
recover damages from the defendant. Thus the victim is not the State's privy, and, 
as defendant argues under his misconstruction of section 403, "The converse must 
also be true." Aplt. Br. at 9. The State is not the victim's privy. Res judicata does 
not, therefore, apply between criminal restitution proceedings and a victim's civil 
action for damages. 
2. Under traditional privity tests, the State is not the victim's 
privy because it has its own legal right to require the 
defendant to pay restitution. 
Even if the Crime Victims Restitution Act did not speak to the issue of privity, 
defendant's claim would still fail, because the State and the victim are not privies 
under traditional principles of privity. 
As explained above, a party is in privity with another for purposes of res 
judicata when that party is "so identified in interest with another that he represents 
16 
the same legal right." Searle Bros., 588 P.2d 691. Traditionally, privity occurs in "a 
mutual or successive relationship to rights in property," id., or when a judgment is 
obtained by one legally appointed to represent another, such as a guardian or 
trustee, see Tremoco, 2005 UT 19,129. 
Defendant claims that the State is Gomez's privy because, "the state can only 
prove damages by standing in for the victim." Aplt. Br. at 7. But the fact that 
restitution is measured by what the victim could recover in a civil lawsuit does not 
make the State the victim's privy. The State is not asserting the "same legal right" as 
the victim in a civil action. Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, % 29. Rather, the State is asserting a 
right independent of the victim's civil remedy: the right to prosecute, punish, and 
rehabilitate criminals. 
While criminal restitution is a civil penalty that facilitates recovery by the 
victim, it is also a remedial and rehabilitative measure that is part of the criminal 
sentence. "When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to the victims " Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201 (4)(a). In determining court ordered restitution, the court must consider, 
among other things, "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii) 
(West 2004). 
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Oregon, on whose restitution statute Utah's is based, see State v. Twitchell, 832 
P.2d 866,869 (Utah App. 1992), has recognized the penal nature of restitution. "The 
theory of restitution is penological: It is intended to serve rehabilitative and 
deterrent purposes by causing a defendant to appreciate the relationship between 
his criminal activity and the damage suffered by the victim." State v. Dillon, 637 
P.2d 602,606 (Or. 1981). Thus, the State's right to seek criminal restitution derives 
not just from the victim's right to compensation, but also from its own right to seek 
a sentence that will rehabilitate the offender. 
Measuring damages by the victim's civil recovery rights does not mean the 
State stands in for the victim to recover his damages. Rather, civil damages are used 
to help the defendant "appreciate the relationship between his criminal activity and 
the damage suffered by the victim." Id. If a prior civil judgment is res judicata to 
criminal restitution, then a victim's faulty or incomplete litigation of his damages 
will infringe on the State's right to use restitution to rehabilitate an offender. To 
fully serve the rehabilitative purposes of restitution, the State must have an 
independent right to require an offender to pay restitution. It thus is not the 
victim's privy, and res judicata does not apply. 
Defendant also claims that privity exists under another theory: litigation 
control. Aplt. Br. at 7. A person "'who is not a party to an action but who controls 
or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is 
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bound by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party/" Tremoco, 
2005 UT 19, \ 30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 39).5 He claims that 
the State and Gomez are in privity because "the State has control over the claim for 
economic damages/7 Aplt. Br. at 7. But defendant misconstrues this type of privity. 
Privity by control of the litigation arises when a non-party to a lawsuit directs 
and controls the lawsuit on behalf of another in order to protect its own interest. 
Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ 30. The judgment of that lawsuit becomes res judicata to the 
non-party. For example, in United States v. Montana, the federal government 
directed and financed a lawsuit by a construction company against the state of 
Montana challenging a Montana public construction tax. United States v. Montana, 
440 U.S. 147, 151 (1979). The United States also filed its own lawsuit against 
Montana challenging the tax. Id. The private suit concluded first and resulted in a 
judgment upholding the tax. Id. Montana then claimed res judicata in the suit by 
the United States. Id at 151-52. 
5
 The supreme court has recognized that this type of privity—litigation 
control—may not be used to establish claim preclusion. This is because '"the cause 
of action which a nonparty has vicariously asserted differs by definition from that 
which he subsequently seeks to litigate in his own right."7 Tremoco, 2005 UT 19 \ 32 
(quoting United States v. Montana, 440 U.S. 147,154 (1979)). Thus, defendant may 
only use this type of privity to establish issue preclusion. 
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The Supreme Court held that the United States was bound by the judgment in 
the prior case because it had controlled and financed the litigation. Id. at 154-55. 
The court noted, "[Although not a party, the United States plainly had a sufficient 
laboring oar in the conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of 
etsoppel." Id. at 155 (quotations omitted). 
Unlike the United States in Montana, the State did not control the litigation in 
Gomez's civil suit against defendant. In fact, there is no evidence that the State was 
even aware of the civil suit at the time it happened. The State cannot, therefore, be 
said to have had its day in court with respect to defendant's restitution obligation. 
C Res judicata does not apply in the instant case because the 
restitution order was based, in part, on criminal conduct not at 
issue in the prior civil suit 
Even if there were privity between the State and the victim, res judicata 
would not apply in this case. For res judicata to apply, the claims and issues in the 
first case must be identical to the claims and issues in the instant case, or the claims 
in the instant case must have been claims that could and should have been brought 
in the first case. See Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ \ 26-27. Where the claims or issues in 
the instant case are not identical to those in the first case and are not claims that 
could and should and should have been raised in the first case, res judicata does not 
bar litigation of those claims or issues. Id. 
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Here, the issues and claims decided in the restitution proceeding were not 
identical to the issues and claims decided by the civil action. Defendant's civil 
complaint alleged that defendant had fraudulently converted funds during the third 
and fourth quarters of 2001 (R. 318-19, 362-63). The complaint did not allege any 
injurious conduct or damages during any other time period, and the default 
judgment did not purport to resolve claims or issues as to any other time period. 
The criminal charges, on the other hand, covered all of 2000 and all of 2001 (R. 8-9). 
At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor explained that the larger restitution 
amount was a result of the greater time period covered by the criminal charges (R. 
430:16). The court agreed and imposed the greater restitution amount (R. 430:18-
21). 
Because Gomez's civil action never litigated the issue of damages for 
defendant's criminal conduct during 2000 and 2001, there is no identity of issues 
between the civil judgment and the criminal restitution order. So issue prelusion 
does not bar restitution greater than $59,000. 
Nor does claim preclusion bar the larger amount. Gomez never brought a 
civil claim against defendant for his conduct during 2000 and the first half of 2001. 
Nor could he have, because he was unaware of defendant's injurious conduct. 
Claim preclusion bars only claims that were brought in the first action or claims that 
could and should have been brought in the first action. See Maoris & Assoc, v. 
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Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, \ 20,16 P.3d 1214. For claim preclusion purposes, a claim 
could and should have been brought only if the "plaintiff was aware of the facts 
upon which the later claims were based at the time the first suit was filed/' Id. at \ 
24. 
Defendant did not show at the restitution hearing that Gomez could and 
should have filed claims for 2000 and the first half of 2001. See Busch v. Busch, 2003 
UT App 131,1 6, 71 P.3d 177 ("The party asserting res judicata has the burden to 
prove its elements"). In fact, the record suggests that when Gomez filed his civil 
complaint, he was not even aware of defendant's criminal actions during 2000 and 
the first half of 2001. His complaint alleged that defendant had refused to turn over 
the tax returns he had filed for Gomez Landscaping (R. 319, 363). Later, at the 
preliminary hearing in the criminal case, Gomez testified that defendant had 
refused to assist him in determining the extent of his embezzlement and Gomez 
Landscaping's resultant tax liability (R. 429:133-34). He explained that "[m]any of 
the records did go with [defendant]" and that defendant never told him that he had 
stopped paying Gomez's payroll taxes (R. 429:133). Later, at the restitution hearing, 
the prosecutor explained that additional losses were discovered that necessitated a 
greater restitution amount (R. 430:16). 
Thus the claims underlying the greater restitution amount were not claims 
that could have been brought in the civil lawsuit. Therefore, neither claim 
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preclusion nor issue preclusion applies in this case, and the trial court correctly 
ordered restitution not just for the conduct Gomez knew about when he filed his 
civil complaint, but for defendant's actual damages to Gomez. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted May 8,2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Criminal No. 021912551FS 
Judge William M. Barrett 
After notice and a hearing in the above cited matter held on May 16, 2005, based upon the 
evidence submitted by the Parties, and good cause appearing, the following is hereby Ordered : 
1. Restitution to Clark Gomez, aka Gomez Landscaping, Inc. of Mapleton, Utah, shall be in 
the amount of $144,702.45, with interest going forward from May 16, 2005 at the legal interest rate 
of4.77%. 
2. Any payments made by the defendant on the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City 
Judgment entered in Civil Case No. 020904977, entered on about August 23, 2002 by Judge Roger 
A. Livingston, up to ihejudgment amount of $59,880.29 shall be credited against the aforementioned 
jestitution amount of $144,702.45, plus interest. 
3. In addition and separate to the foregoing, the defendant owes restitution to the Utah State 
JUL I -12005 
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Tax Commission in the amount of $43,312.36, plus interest at the legal rate of 4.77% going forward 
» 
from May 16, 2005 on account of unpaid income taxes, subject to possible adjustments based upon 
the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) figures in defendant's federal returns as accepted by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
4. The defendant shall file a financial affidavit with the Court, with copies to the State and the 
Utah State Tax Commission, on or before May 31, 2005, which affidavit shall include any and all 
assets, liabilities, income from every source, and any other relevant financial information, which is 
part of, or affects, defendant's current financial situation. 
5. The defendant shall obtain full time employment and shall report to the Court and the Utah 
State Tax Commission and Adult Probation and Parole all specifics concerning such employment, 
including the name of the employer, name of supervisor, and compensation. As previously ordered, 
the defendant is proscribed from working as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and is further 
prohibited from dealing as a fiduciary and/or handling any parties funds, except for his own. 
6. The defendant may work under the direct supervision of a CPA on condition that he is 
prohibited fiom handling any client's funds in any capacity and may not act as a fiduciary in any 
capacity. This condition is subject \p Court review and acceptance- * ' rCrt*V. 
J2: DATED this /</~ day of ^yjf/pM, :', 2005. • 
William M. Barrett . "*' .< 
District CoiltJ-Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I have delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to: 
Randall K. Spencer, Esq. 
Fillmore & Spencer, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mark Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 5th Fir. 
SLC, Utah 84154 
F \User\MBAER\Tax\GibsonProposedOrderReRestHeanngMay05 wpd 
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Addendum B 
r i y i l ' - > ^ *-»'•«' >~ ^ '* '2 
Third J.<-'** District 
Mark W. Baer - 5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
Heber Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0199 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268 
sriesa. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON 
DOB: 6-24-56 
Defendant 
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE 
OF PLEA 
Case No. 021912551 
COMES NOW, VAL DEAN GIBSON, the defendant in this case and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered pleas of guilty to the following crime(s): 
CRIME 
Willful evasion of Income Tax 
UCA §76-8-1101(d) 
Supplying False or Fraudulent 
Information 
UCA §76-8-1101 (1)(c) 
DEGREE 
PENALTY 
2nd Degree Felony 
3ra Degree Felony 
POSSIBLE 
SENTENCE 
1-15yrsUSP (Ct: 1) 
$1,500 to $25,000 fine 
85% surcharge* 
0 - 5 Yrs USP (Ct: 4) 
$1,000 to $5,000 fine 
85% surcharge* 
Unlawful Dealing of Property 
by a Fiduciary 
UCA §76-6-513 
Communications Fraud 
Of Unlawful Activity 
Unlawful and Unprofessional 
Conduct UCA §58-1-501/502 
2na Degree Felony 
3rd Degree Felony 
(as amended) 
1-15YrsUSP (Ct:6) 
up to $10000 fine 
85% surcharge 
0- 5 yrs USP (Ct:8 ) 
up to $5 ,000 fine 
85% surcharge 
Class A Misdemeanor 0 - 1 Yrs Jail (Ct: 10) 
up to $1,000 fine 
85% surcharge 
* Utah Code § 76-8-1101 indicates that notwithstanding §76-3-301, a fine under UCA § 
76-8-1101(1 )(c) shall be no less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 and that a fine under 
UCA § 76-8-1101 (1 )(d) shall be no less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
I have received a copy of the charge against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
- (Ct. 1) On or about April 15, 2000 Salt Lake County, I did intentionally or willfully 
attempt to evade or defeat a tax or the payment of a tax; to wit, Utah State Income Tax for 
tax year 1999. 
- (Ct. 4) On or about March 2, 2001 to April 15, 2001, in Salt Lake County, I 
supplied false or fraudulent information in the form of a W-2, to the Utah State Tax 
Commission, purporting to evidence wages, tips or other compensation, which information 
was false or fraudulent. 
\u0 
- (Ct 6) On or about January 2000 through December, 2001, did deal with property 
entrusted to me as a fiduciary in a manner which I knew was a violation of my duty and 
which involved a substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner and the value of the 
property exceeded $5,000.00. 
- (Ct. 8) On or about December 4 - December 21, 2002, in Salt Lake Count, I did 
devise a scheme to defraud Lani Hatch and/or Drywall Surgeons, by means of 
communicating false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, communicated 
to Mr. Hatch, and the value of such property was and or purported to be in excess of 
$1,000.00. 
- (Ct. 10) On different occasions, beginning on or about October 2000 and going 
through February 29, 2002 in Salt Lake County, I did practice or engage in conduct, 
representing myself to be licensed as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), an occupation 
or profession requiring licensure under Utah Code Title 58, while I was restricted from so 
doing by not have an active license at such time. 
My conduct, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as 
follows: During the time periods in question, I was self-employed at Gibson and Company, 
Inc, a public accounting operation, located in Sandy, Utah and/or a business by the name 
of Valco, Inc, located in Sandy, Utah. During such employment, I received 
income/wages/compensation in excess of the minimum which required me to file a return 
and I was obligated to pay some taxes thereupon, which I did not, and thus evaded my 
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obligation to pay state income taxes. In addition, during the relevant time period, I 
submitted to the Utah State Tax Commission a document or documents purporting to 
represent that I had income in excess of $2.6 million (dollars) and sought a refund on 
account of same. Further, acting in the capacity of an accountant and/or finance 
professional, I accepted in excess of $5,000.00 from Clark Gomez, and/or Gomez 
Landscaping for the purposes of accounting, reporting and turning over said funds to 
appropriate tax authorities, and I did not properly account, report and turnover the same. 
Still further, during the relevant time period, I used letterhead that indicated that I was a 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and/or held myself out to be a Certified Public 
Accountant despite the fact that my license had expired. Finally, during the time period in 
question, I did accept funds from a Lani Hatch, who was doing business as Drywall 
Surgeons in excess of $1,000.00 and did not properly, completely or fully communicate to 
Mr. Hatch where those exact funds were going and/or to what purpose they were used or 
were to be used. 
1 am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with complete knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts and representations, in conjunction with those 
communicated to me by my counsel: 
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
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condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the 
court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Scott Williams, Esquire. 
I have had an opportunity to discuss this Statement, my rights and the consequences of 
my guilty plea(s) with my attorney. 
I know that I have a right to a speedy trial and also a trial by jury, or if waived, 
a trial in front of a judge acting as a finder of fact, and that in the case of a jury, the jury 
would have to be unanimous in order to convict. 
I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify 
in court on my behalf if I could not so afford to do. 
" ^ y ~ 5 . I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf, but if I choose not to do 
so, I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
^« 6. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
^ 7 . know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury 
or by a judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah, and that if I could not 
afford to pay the costs and attorney fees for such appeal, those expenses would be paid 
by the State. I further understand that by entering a plea at this time, that I will enjoy only 
limited rights of appeal, particularly as compared to those rights I might have after a trial. 
'
yU? 8. I know the maximum possible sentence that may be imposed for each offense 
to which I plead guilty. I know that the sentence may be for a prison term, a fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to any fine, a 85% surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated § 
63-63a-1, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
restitution to any victim or victims of my crime and that the State will be asking for such. 
I know that imprisonment or probation may be for consecutive periods, for this 
case or with respect to any other case in which I am presently involved, and/or as concerns 
the fine. I also know that if I am incarcerated, on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
fy/ 10. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my statutory and 
constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by entering such 
plea(s), I admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) 
for which my plea(s) is/are entered. I understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) 
n 
of guilty must be filed with the court within 30 days after my sentencing and that any right 
to appeal after the entering of a plea(s) would be much more limited than an appeal after 
a trial by jury or by the Court. 
11. My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the State. 
The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, include the following: 
- The State has agreed to dismiss all counts with prejudice to which I am not 
entering a plea and will agree not to file any additional criminal tax charges arising out of 
the activity, or like kind criminal activity as it relates to tax, that has occurred or may have 
occurred on or before the date of this Agreement - subject to the any and all conditions as 
stated in this document and/or any Court order in this case; 
-1 will keep the Court appraised of my current address and any changes in that 
address within five (5) days of any change and I also understand and agree that any further 
filings and/or pleadings, including any notices, requests or show cause proceedings 
initiated by the State may be served upon my counsel of record; 
-1 agree that criminal restitution for unpaid state taxes and for losses to private 
victims will be requested by the State and may be entered in this case for all years, not just 
the years on tax year(s) for which I am pleading. Such restitution may include appropriate 
penalties and/or interest. 
-1 agree that the State is seeking and/or may seek as criminal restitution, amounts 
not only for the counts for which I am entering pleas, but also for those counts which, in 
accordance with this agreement are being dismissed, including restitution to all private 
individual(s). 
-1 understand that the State firmly believes as of the time of the entering of this 
Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or above 44£§?000r 
Furthermore, the State believes that restitution is owed to private victim Hatch in excess 
of $50,000, although the defendant may have legitimate offsets which the State agrees to 
consider, review and acknowledge if legitimate, and further that the State will consider 
recommending that the conviction on Count 8 be adjusted downward by the Court if said 






- I understand that if evidence is found and presented at a future time which 
exonerates me from the charges to which I have plead guilty, said charges may be 
reviewed by the Court. 
- I understand that the Utah State Tax Commission's criminal investigation unit 
agrees to review for investigation of and/or refer to appropriate investigation agency(ies) 
any person known or suspected by the defendant to have violated any provisions of the 
Utah Criminal Code. 
-1 agree to cooperate with any federal authorities in determining what tax liability I 
may have with regard to federal taxes for any years not so bared for consideration under 
federal law or rule as of the date of the entering of this plea. 
-1 agree to fully cooperate in any proceedings with the Utah State Tax Commission -
formal or informal - to determine liability, if any, I may have with respect to any tax liabilities 
I may owe, for whatever year(s) as requested by said Commission. 
-1 agree to cooperate with the Utah Department of Professional Licensing (DOPL) 
and/or any other authorities in any further review of my acting as a Certified Public 
Accountant and/or my holding out so to be when I was not so licensed. 
- I understand that the State will recommend a fine in the low range of that 
applicable by law and will recommend probation, which may or will likely contain as a 
condition of probation a jail sentence, at least at the first scheduled sentencing date in this 
case, assuming that I, the defendant, have complied with any and all pre-sentencing 
conditions either as contained in this document and as accepted by the Court at the time 
of the change of plea hearing. 
12. Other conditions specifically reviewed and approved by me are as follows: 
- I must truthfully cooperate with Utah State Tax Commission authorities in 
determining my liabilities, if any, thereto and arranging a repayment plan where applicable; 
-1 must truthfully file any past (from this date) state tax return as requested by the 
Utah State Tax Commission (USTC), and absolutely must file all current, and future tax 
returns as a condition of any sentence in this case, both as to personal and business 
returns if applicable, as required by the USTC and/or state law, and I will have to pay any 
taxes, penalties and/or interest that may arise from this obligation; 
w_ 
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- I must cooperate with the USTC in any further non-criminal hearing to review 
and/or determine my personal/business tax status and/or tax liabilities or any persons or 
entities with whom I have represented or purported to represent. 
-1 understand that the State will ask that I perform a community service obligation 
of 250 hours if I am placed on probation by the sentencing Court. 
- The State acknowledges that in the event that the defendant is placed on any 
condition of probation in this case, that the State will agree to review this case at the time 
of the end of the probationary period, or any extensions thereto unless such extensions are 
due to the defendant's non-cooperation, lor the purpose of considering any motion that 
might be filed by the defendant in the nature of a 402 motion, in order to have the 
defendants convictions reduced and the State will not oppose such a one step reduction 
so long as the defendant has fully complied with any and all conditions placed upon him by 
this Agreement and the Court at sentencing and/or by the Court at anytime thereafter. 
13. I further realize that I must be truthful and honest in all representations made to 
any Court dealing with this case and also to any Adult Probation and Parole Officer 
assigned to conduct a Pre-Sentence Investigation and/or as assigned to this case in the 
event that I am placed on probation, and that I must appear for sentencing in this case, and 
that a failure any of these regards, will free the State from any limitations as to the State's 
recommendations in this case as laid out in this agreement, particularly with respect to any 
recommendations regarding incarceration. 
lyT 14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges, made or sought by 
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the Judge. I also 
know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are 




15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty; no promises except those contained herein have been made to me. 
16. I've read this Statement or had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements contained 
therein are correct. Further, I understand that this Statement has been jointly created by 
myself and the State and nothing shall be construed against either party on the basis of the 
source or creation of this document. 
17. I'm satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
us*'' 18.1 am T o years of age; I have attended school through the Ug^ grade and I 
can read and understand the English language. I was/am not under the influence of any 
drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made. I am not 
presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which impair my 
judgment. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental 
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 




CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for Val Dean Gibson, the defendant above, and 
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her and I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing statement, 




CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
1 certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Val 
Dean Gibson, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as 
supplemented on the record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 





Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, the 
court finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be 
accepted and entered. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





v VAL GIBSON, Defendant, 
COMPLAINT 
civil No. fl^&yfly?77 
Judge [^.c U\/\JDL s f g » \ 
Plaintiff, Gomez Landscaping, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with it principal office in Utah County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant is a certified Public Accountant who was employed by the Plaintiff 
to perform accounting services for the Plaintiff during the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
4. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to prepare and file all of its payroll taxes. 
5. During the year 2001 the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to make payments 
covering all of the payroll taxes directly to the Defendant, with the understanding that the 
Defendant would then make out the checks to pay the payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
-^ip 
6. During trie diird quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximatelx$50,000m 
7. During the Fourth Quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximateK^WOO.OO. 
8. The Defendant wrongfully represented to the Plaintiff that it should make the 
payments for the withholding taxes directly to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to make 
the payments to the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
9. The Defendant knew that it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to make the tax 
payment directly to the Defendant, but that the normal procedure would have been for the 
Defendant to prepare the necessaiy tax forms and then inform the Plaintiff of the tax due or give 
the returns to the Plaintiff who would then make its payment directly to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
10. The Defendant intentionally had the Plaintiff give the monies to him so that the 
Defendant would have control of the same. 
11. The Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of the Defendant's real purpose 
for having the monies paid directly to the Defendant. 
12. The Plaintiff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant paid directly to 
the Defendant the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousai^^59,000.00jdollars. Defendant represented to 
Plaintiff that he would use these funds to pay the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State 
Tax Commission on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
« * * ~ ^ 
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i j . 1 he Plaintui in reliance on the representations of the Defendant made the 
payments directly to the Defendant. 
14. The Defendant did not make the payments to the Internal Revenue Serivce and the 
Utah State Tax Commission as he had said he would do. Instead, he converted the funds he 
received from Plaintiff to his own use and benefit. 
15. The Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue Service and informed that it 
had not received the monthly deposits of approximately $12,000.00 the last 2 months in the 
fourth quarter, nor the sum of approximately $27,000.00 for the third quarter of 2001. 
16. Because the Defendant did not make the payments he said he would make on 
behalf of Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been required to pay to the Internal Revenue Service the sum 
of $51,000.00 plus interest and penalties totaling„$2L000.00. 
17. The Plaintiff has also been required to pay to the Utah state Tax Commission the 
sum of $6,000.00 for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. 
18. The Plaintiff has attempted to reach the Defendant to obtain copies of the tax 
forms which the Defendant prepared and to have him return the monies which he wrongfully 
convert to his own use which belonged to the Plaintiff, but has not been successful in so doing. 
19. The Defendant has refused and failed to deliver copies of the tax returns to the 
Plaintiff or to refund the monies which he converted to his own use and benefit. 
20. In addition the IRS hasjilacea tax lien on the equipment owned by Gomez 
Equipment, Inc. in the amount^£$8,400.00 fo^Aaxes which the Plaintiff is informed were 
wrongfully applied to the account of the Plaintiff. 
3 
Fraudulent Conversion 
21. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-20 
as if fUlly set forth herein. 
22. The Defendant wrongfully converted all of the monies which the Plaintiff 
deposited with him for the payment of its payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and the 
Utah State Tax Commission to his own use and benefit. 
23. The Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00), 
or such other amount as may be actually determined at trial, plus costs, reasonable attorneys fees 
and interest. 
Conversion 
24. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-23 
as if fully set forth herein. 
25. The Defendant has willfully interfered with the monies belonging to the Plaintiff. 
26. The Defendant, without lawful justification, used the Plaintiffs money for his 
own use and benefit. 
27. The acts of theT)efendant have deprived the Plaintiff of the use and benefit of its 
money. 
Conversion 
28. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-29 
as if fully set forth herein. 
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29. The Defendant's actions are the result of willful and malicious or fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of, the rights of others. 
30. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount to be proved at trial, but which shall not be less than three times the 
amount of compensatory and general damages awarded at trial. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff request that judgment as follows: 
1. For the fraudulent conversion of the sum of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000.00) 
dollars. 
2. For costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and interest as provided by law. 
3. For punitive damages. 
4. For an order of this Court requiring the Defendant to deliver to the Plaintiff all 
books and records that belonging to the Plaintiff, together with all records that the defendant has 
prepared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
5. For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be just and 
equitable in the premises. 
Dated this 7th day of June, 2002. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
fc 
Richard C. Ckhoon 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
1737 Fairway Lane 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone:'(801)415-3000 
Fax: (801) 415-3500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 020904977 
VAL GIBSON, 
Defendant, Judge Livingston 
Plaintiff, Gomez Landscaping, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with it principal office in Utah County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant is a certified Public Accountant who was employed by the Plaintiff 
to perform accounting services for the Plaintiff during the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
4. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to prepare and file all of its payroll taxes. 
5. During the year 2001 the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to make payments 
covering all of the payroll taxes directly to the Defendant, with the understanding that the 
Defendant would then make out the checks to pay the payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
"J : ,7f . :^T 
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6. During uic diird quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximately $30,000.00. 
7. During the Fourth Quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximately $30,000.00. 
8. The Defendant wrongfully represented to the Plaintiff that it should make the 
payments for the withholding taxes directly to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to make 
the payments to the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
9. The Defendant knew that it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to make the tax 
payment directly to the Defendant, but that the normal procedure would have been for the 
Defendant to prepare the necessary tax forms and then inform the Plaintiff of the tax due or give 
the returns to the Plaintiff who would then make its payment directly to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
10. The Defendant intentionally had the Plaintiff give the monies to him so that the 
Defendant would have control of the same. 
11. The Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of the Defendant's real purpose 
for having the monies paid directly to the Defendant. 
12. The Plaintiff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant paid directly to 
the Defendant the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00) dollars. Defendant represented to 
Plaintiff that he would use these funds to pay the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State 
Tax Commission on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
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13. The Plamaff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant made the 
payments directly to the Defendant. 
14. The Defendant did not make the payments to the Internal Revenue Serivce and the 
Utah State Tax Commission as he had said he would do. Instead, he converted the funds he 
received from Plaintiff to his own use and benefit. 
15. The Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue Service and informed that it 
had not received the monthly deposits of approximately $12,000.00 the last 2 months in the 
fourth quarter, nor the sum of approximately $27,000.00 for the third quarter of 2001. 
16. Because the Defendant did not make the payments he said he would make on 
behalf of Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been required to pay to the Internal Revenue Service the sum 
of $51,000.00 plus interest and penalties totaling $2,000.00. 
17. The Plaintiff has also been required to pay to the Utah state Tax Commission the 
sum of $6,000.00 for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. 
18. The Plaintiff has attempted to reach the Defendant to obtain copies of the tax 
forms which the Defendant prepared and to have him return the monies which he wrongfully 
convert to his own use which belonged to the Plaintiff, but has not been successful in so doing. 
19. The Defendant has refused and failed to deliver copies of the tax returns to the 
Plaintiff or to refund the monies which he converted to his own use and benefit. 
20. In addition the IRS has place a tax lien on the equipment owned by Gomez 
Equipment, Inc. in the amount of $8,400.00 for taxes which the Plaintiff is informed were 
wrongfully applied to the account of the Plaintiff 
3 
Fraudulent Conversion 
21. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 -20 
as if fully set forth herein. 
22. The Defendant wrongfully converted all of the monies which the Plaintiff 
deposited with him for the payment of its payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and the 
Utah State Tax Commission to his own use and benefit. 
23. The Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00), 
or such other amount as may be actually determined at trial, plus costs, reasonable attorneys fees 
and interest. 
Conversion 
24. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-23 
as if fully set forth herein. 
25. The Defendant has willfully interfered with the monies belonging to the Plaintiff. 
26. The Defendant, without lawful justification, used the Plaintiffs money for his 
own use and benefit. 
27. The acts of the Defendant have deprived the Plaintiff of the use and benefit of its 
money. 
Punitive Damages 
28. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-29 
as if fully set forth herein. 
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29. The Defendant's actions are the result of willful and malicious or fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of, the rights of others. 
30. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount to be proved at trial, but which shall not be less than three times the 
amount of compensatory and general damages awarded at trial. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff request that judgment as follows: 
1. For the fraudulent conversion of the sum of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000.00) 
dollars. 
2. For costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and interest as provided by law. 
3. For punitive damages. 
4. For an order of this Court requiring the Defendant to deliver to the Plaintiff all 
books and records that belonging to the Plaintiff, together with all records that the defendant has 
prepared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
5. For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be just and 
equitable in the premises. 
Dated this 11th day of June, 2002. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Richard C. C4hoon 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
1737 Fairway Lane 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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Richard C. Cahoon (A535) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 415-3000 
Fax: (801) 415-3500 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ENTER DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT AND AWARD 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Civil No. 020904977 
Judge Livingston 
The Plaintiff submits the following memorandum in support of its motion for an award 
of punitive damages: 
FACTS 
1. In 1999 the Plaintiff employed the Defendant Val Gibson as a certified public 
accountant (CPA) to handle the accounting work for its business. 
2. The Defendant was to prepare the payroll checks for all the Plaintiffs employees 
and withhold all income taxes, both state and federal, the social security taxes, and the medicare 
taxes due on the Plaintiffs bi-monthly payroll. 
3. The defendant was to prepare the form 941 and then deposit the federal incomes 
withlield from the employees checks together with the social security taxes and medicare taxes 
withlield with Internal Revenue Service. 
1 
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4. The Defendant was also to deposit with the Utah State Commission the State 
Income taxes withheld from the all of the Plaintiffs employees' salary. 
5. The Defendant was also to deposit with the Utah Department of Work Force 
Services the Plaintiffs unemployment insurance contribution for all of the Plaintiffs employees. 
6. The Defendant requested and received from the Plaintiff a check every two weeks 
in an amount that would allow the Defendant to not only pay the employees' salaries, but also 
pay all of the necessary deposits and pay the Plaintiffs share of the social security, medicare 
taxes, and insurance contributions. 
7. The Defendant properly performed all of these services which he represented he 
would do throughout the latter part of the year 1999 and all of 2000. 
8. The Defendant was to continued to perform these same services in 2001 and 
based on the amounts he requested, the Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant checks bi-monthly in 
an amount that would allow the Defendant to not only pay the employees' salaries, but to pay all 
of the necessary deposits and pay the Plaintiffs share of the social security, medicare taxes, and 
insurance contributions. A copy of the checks paid to the Defendant in 2001, totaling 
$309,130.70 is attached hereto as exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
9. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to continue to prepare, deposit and file all of 
the other taxes and forms as required in 2001 as he had done in the year 2000; however in the 
month of November 2001, the President of the Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue 
Service and informed that they had not received any deposits for income taxes, social security or 
medicare taxes, nor had they received the Plaintiffs necessary tax forms covering the same for 
the year 2001. 
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10. The Plaintiff contacted the Defendant regarding the Defendant's failure to 
perform the accounting services agreed upon, but the Defendant failed and refused to provided 
the forms or any explanation of why he had not deposited the taxes or filed the necessary tax 
forms. 
11. As a result it became necessary for the Plaintiff to deposit with the Internal 
Revenue Service and Utah State Tax Commission an additional sum of fifty-seven thousand 
dollars ($57,000.00) which the Plaintiff had in fact paid to the Defendant which the Defendant 
wrongfully and intentionally had fraudulently converted to his own use and benefit which had 
been given to him in order to pay the taxes owed by the Plaintiff to the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Utah State Tax Commission, plus the sum of two thousand dollars($2000.00) in penalties 
and interest to the LR.S. 
ARGUMENT 
The actions of the Defendant in fraudulently converting the Plaintiffs money to his own 
use and benefit was a willful and malicious act on the part of the Defendant. The conduct of the 
Defendant in knowingly and willfully taking the money which the Plaintiff had delivered to him 
to pay its payroll and payroll taxes is the type of action for which this court should impose 
punitive damages. The Utah Court of appeals set out the factors which this Court should consider 
in determining the amount of punitive damages, in the case of Arnica Mutual Insurance Company 
v. Schettler 768 P2d 950 (Utah App 1989): 
A trial court should consider seven factors in assessing the amount of punitive 
damages: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant, (2) the nature of the alleged 
misconduct, (3) the facts and circumstance surrounding the misconduct, (4) the 
effect thereof upon the lives of the plaintiff and others, (5) the probability of 
future recurrence of the misconduct, (6) the relationship between the parties, and 
(7) the amount of actual damages awarded. 
3 
As indicated in the facts, we know the nature of the alleged misconduct came as a result 
of the reliance and trust which the Plaintiff placed in the Defendant based upon the fact that he 
was a CPA and that he had been working for the Plaintiff and had successfully performed his 
services in the prior year. The Defendant was given monies to make the necessary tax deposits 
with the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission and he fraudulently 
converted these monies for his own use and benefit The actions of the Defendant caused the 
Plaintiff to incur penalties and interest of $2,000.00 on the sum of fifty-one thousand dollars 
($51,000.00) it owed to the I.R.S. in addition to having to pay the sum of fifty-one thousand 
dollars ($51,000.00) twice. The effect of the Defendant's actions was to cause the Plaintiff who 
had relied on the Defendant to perform the services for which he had been employed to suffer the 
embarrassment of having the I.R.S. inform it that its taxes had not been paid and to come up with 
an additional fifty-three thousand dollars ($53,000.00), including penalties and interest, with 
which to pay the unpaid taxes. The Plaintiff was also required to pay the Utah State Tax 
Commission the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) in unpaid state income tax that was 
owed on its employees salaries which the Defendant had converted to his own use and benefit. 
The Plaintiff is still trying to sort out the mess that the Defendant created, and has had to hire a 
new accountant to recreate and prepare its necessary tax returns for the year 2001. 
The Defendant's actions of fraudulently converting money which he had been given in a 
position of trust for his own use and benefit, violated the trust which the Plaintiff placed in the 
Defendant and the Defendant's profession. The breach of this trust is the very type of action for 
which the concept of punitive damages was developed to correct. The Defendant should not be 
allowed to ignore this type of conduct with only the obligation to repay the actual damages, but 
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a punitive damages should be imposed to teach the Defendant that the type of conduct will not 
be tolerated. 
We do not know the Defendant's personal net worth, but we do know that he is fifty-
seven thousand dollars ($57,000.00) to the good, as a result of this fraudulent conversion. The 
Courts have indicated that there is no fixed formula for determining the"reasonableness" of a 
punitive damage award. Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983). In the case of Van 
Dyke v. Mountain Coin Mack DisL, 758 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah Ct. App.1988) the Court allowed a 
punitive damage award that was 50 times greater than the actual damage award. "The nature of 
the conduct should be carefully considered when reviewing the relationship between actual and 
punitive damages and a higher multiple allowed to punish clearly outrageous conduct. Punitive 
damages are intended to punish and "to take the profit out of wrongdoing". Arnica v. Schettler at 
975. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the facts of this case are such that the court should enter a judgment in 
the sum of fifty-nine thousand dollars ($59,000.00) plus interest from the date funds were 
wrongfully converted in actual dollars and punitive damages in an equal amount. 
Respectfully submitted thi 
David Tufts 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
So?£? day of July, 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This will certify that on the^^day of July, 2002,1 served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENTER DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT AND AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES upon the following party by depositing 
the same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Val Gibson 
99 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
<§pvQ. 3 5 ^ 
^ 
RICHARD C. CAHOON (A535) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 415-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Civil No. 020904977 
Judge Livingston 
The Plaintiffs Motion to enter Default Judgment and Award Punitive Damages 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Roger Livingston on August 9, 2002. The 
Plaintiffs President Clark Gomez and Counsel Richard C. Cahoon were present, the Defendant 
did not appear. The Defendant was aware of the Hearing, having faxed a letter to the Plaintiffs 
President early this morning regarding the hearing. The Court having reviewed the pleading and 
being fully advised of the fraudulent actions of the Defendant in breaching his fiduciary duty as a 
CPA, and taking Judicial Notice that the conduct of the Defendant Val Gibson's manifested a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff in the breach 
of his fiduciary duty as a CPA, now enters the following Judgement: 
P I » " FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 23 2002 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OFJUPfityENTS 
020904977
 G | B S 0 N V A L JD 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgement be entered 
against the Defendant Val Gibson for his fraudulent actions for and on behalf of the Plaintiff in 
the Sum of Fifty-nine Thousand eight hundred eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29) 
plus all interest and additional penalties imposed by the IRS or the Utah Tax Commission, as 
shall be determined by an affidavit signed by the Plaintiffs President setting forth the penalties 
and interest assessed, and punitive damages in the sum of Sixty Thousand dollars ($60,000.00). 
Together, with all Court Costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in the Collection of said 
Judgement. 
Dated this ^ J L d a y of August 2002. 
-n7? 
Richard C. Cahoon (A535) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 




















IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




, a Utah 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendant, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 020904977 
Judge Livingston 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Affidavit and Judgment in the 
above-referenced matter this o p day of August, 2002, postage prepaid to: 
Mr. Val Gibson 
99 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 





U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-101 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Kd Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
KM Part 1. General Provisions 
-•§ 77-38a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Crime Victims Reparations Act, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 
63-25a-403. 
Pleas in abeyance, manner, see § 77-2a-3. 
Restitution, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 63-25a-403. 
Sentencing, see § 76-3-201 et seq. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
15 A.L.R.5th 391, Measure and Elements of Restitution to "Which Victim is Entitled 
Under State Criminal Statute. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-101, UT ST § 77-38a-101 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 




U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*Hl Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*S Part 1. General Provisions 
-•§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts 
or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair 
market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary 
damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon 
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution 
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant 
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&format=HTMLE&dataid 5/8/2006 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102 
forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon 
which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in 
abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or 
any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or 
where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time 
of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment 
for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may 
be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, 
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an 
accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that 
has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 
2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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110kl222.1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-201 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
KM Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*afl Part 2. Restitution Determination 
-*§ 77-38a-201. Restitution determination—Law enforcement duties and 
responsibilities 
Any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which 
would constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall provide in the 
investigative reports whether a claim for restitution exists, the basis for the 
claim, and the estimated or actual amount of the claim. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law kl222.1. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 110kl222.1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-201, UT ST § 77-38a-201 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 




U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202 
WestTs Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*fi Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*i Part 2. Restitution Determination 
-•§ 77-38a-202. Restitution determination—Prosecution duties and 
responsibilities 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a 
felony or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal 
attorney, or district attorney shall provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for 
restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as 
part of the plea disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county 
attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution 
amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea 
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which 
the defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution 
claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 5, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
District and Prosecuting Attorneys C^S • 
Sentencing and Punishment €=^2162. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 131k8; 350Hk2162. 
C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 20 to 21, 29 to 30. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202, UT ST § 77-38a-202 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print.westlaw.com/delivery .html?dest=atp&format=HTMLE&dataid=A00558000000... 5/8/2006 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 




U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-203 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*ii Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*& Part 2. Restitution Determination 
-•§ 77-38a-203. Restitution determination—Department of Corrections — 
Presentence investigation 
(1) (a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in 
accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency 
involved shall provide all available victim information to the department upon 
request. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the 
offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the 
recommended amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, 
accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment by 
the defendant of court-ordered restitution with interest as defined in Section 
77-38a-302; 
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the 
victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(v) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or 
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon 
the victim or the victim1s family that the court requires. 
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon 
request all invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of 
earnings, and out-of-pocket loss. The crime victim shall also provide upon 
request: 
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from 
insurance companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or 
federal government received as a direct result of the crime for injury, loss, 
earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; and 
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(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, 
drivers license number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone 
numbers. 
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or part 
of the requested information shall result in the court determining restitution 
based on the best information available. 
(2) (a) The court shall order the defendant as part of the presentence 
investigation to submit to the department any information determined necessary to 
be disclosed for the purpose of ascertaining the restitution. 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the 
requisite information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek 
future amendment or alteration of the restitution order predicated on the 
undisclosed information. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution recommended in the presentence investigation, the court shall set a 
hearing date to resolve the matter. 
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 6, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 4, eff. May 2, 
2005. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Sentencing and Punishment €=^286, 299. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 350Hk286; 350Hk299. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1506. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
K<M Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
KM Part 3. Restitution Requirements 
-•§ 77-38a-301. Restitution—Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make 
restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Sentencing and Punishment €=>2100. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2100. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Restitution, 
In general, 
Probation, revocation for failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and 
restitution, equal protection, see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 
S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308 
S.E.2d 63. 
Amount of restitution, 
Restitution calculation, losses caused by offense of conviction, 
unauthorized 
use of credit card, see Hughey v. U.S., U.S.Tex.1990, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 495 
U.S. 411, 109 L.Ed.2d 408, on remand 907 F.2d 39. 
Restitution as condition of probation, 
Bankruptcy, dischargeability of restitution obligations imposed as 
conditions 
of probation, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 
U.S.Pa.1990, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 495 U.S. 552, 109 L.Ed.2d 588. 
Bankruptcy, restitution obligation discharge, condition of probation, see 
Kelly v. Robinson, U.S.Conn.1986, 107 S.Ct. 353, 479 U.S. 36, 93 L.Ed.2d 
216. 
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Consideration of alternatives to incarceration before revocation, see Black 
v. Romano, U.S.Mo.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 471 U.S. 606, 85 L.Ed.2d 636, rehearing 
denied 105 S.Ct. 3548, 473 U.S. 921, 87 L.Ed.2d 671. 
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, equal protection, 
see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76 
L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308 S.E.2d 63. 
Resentencing, drug possession, see U.S. v. Granderson, U.S.Ga.1994, 114 
S.Ct. 1259, 511 U.S. 39, 127 L.Ed.2d 611. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-301, UT ST § 77-38a-301 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
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C 
Westfs Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*S Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*il Part 3. Restitution Requirements 
-f§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102 (14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at 
the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense 
that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal 
activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the 
law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim1 s determinable wages that are lost 
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were 
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at 
the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted 
in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5) (a) 
and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii) , the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one 
year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within 
one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer 
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of 
restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 
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2002; Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Pardons and parole board, authority, see § 77-27-5. 
Restitution, payment, see § 77-27-6. 
Victims' bill of rights, see § 77-37-3. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Sentencing and Punishment €==>2133, 2148, 2150 to 2152, 2162, 2201. 




15 A.L.R.5th 391, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled 
Under State Criminal Statute. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
Ability to pay 4 
Acceptance of responsibility 8 
Admissibility of evidence 21 
Authority of court 5 
Bankruptcy 23.5 
Calculation of loss 6 
Cause of loss 7 
Court's jurisdiction to enforce restitution order 10 
Criminal intent 9 
Death of defendant 11 
Discretion of court 12 
Due process 2 
Extradition costs 13 
Hearing 20 
Losses reimbursed by insurance 14 
Mandamus 19 
Pecuniary damage 15 
Preservation of grounds for review 24 
Remand 26 
Reparations 16 
Restitution order 23 
Retrospective and ex post facto laws 3 
Review 25 
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C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*m Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
KM Part 4. Restitution Judgments 
-+§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment—Interest—Civil actions—Lien 
(1) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Section 
77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the 
parties. 
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the department may, on behalf of the 
person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and 
the victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil 
process, the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(4) A judgment ordering restitution when recorded in a registry of judgments 
docket shall have the same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment 
in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing, including prejudgment interest. 
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be 
credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Crime Victims Reparations Act, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 
63-25a-403. 
Restitution, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 63-25a-403. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Interest €=>22(1) . 
Sentencing and Punishment C^2212. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 219k22(l); 350Hk2212. 




U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-402 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
KS Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
K& Part 4. Restitution Judgments 
-•§ 77-38a-402. Nondischargeability in bankruptcy 
Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with 
Subsection 77-38a-401 (4) is considered a debt and may not be discharged in 
bankruptcy. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Bankruptcy €=>3359. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 51k3359. 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 333. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-402, UT ST § 77-38a-402 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-403 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Kd Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
K\M Part 4. Restitution Judgments 
-•§ 77-38a-403. Civil action by victim for damages 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the 
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover 
damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has 
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may not be introduced in 
any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the 
defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil 
action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a 
defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is 
conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent 
civil action. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 11, eff. April 30, 2001. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Crime Victims Reparations Act, compensable losses and amounts, see § 63-25a-411 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Damages C=>63. 
Judgment €=>559, 64 8. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 115k63; 228k559; 228k648. 
C.J.S. Damages §§ 169 to 171. 
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 918, 920 to 929. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-403, UT ST § 77-38a-403 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Kd Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
Kd Part 4. Restitution Judgments 
-•§ 77-38a-404. Priority 
(1) If restitution to more than one person, agency, or entity is set at the same 
time, the department shall establish the following priorities of payment, except 
as provided in Subsection (3): 
(a) the crime victim; 
(b) the Office of Crime Victim Reparations; 
(c) any other government agency which has provided reimbursement to the victim as 
a result of the offender's criminal conduct; 
(d) the person, entity, or governmental agency that has offered and paid a reward 
under Section 76-3-201.1 or 78-3a-118; 
(e) any insurance company which has provided reimbursement to the victim as a 
result of the offender's criminal conduct; and 
(f) any county correctional facility to which the court has ordered the defendant 
to pay restitution under Subsection 76-3-201(6). 
(2) Restitution ordered under Subsection (1) (f) is paid after criminal fines and 
surcharges are paid. 
(3) If the offender is required under Section 53-10-404 to reimburse the 
department for the cost of obtaining the offender's DNA specimen, this 
reimbursement is the next priority after restitution to the crime victim under 
Subsection (1)(a). 
(4) All money collected for court-ordered obligations from offenders by the 
department will be applied: 
(a) first, to victim restitution, except the $30 per month required to be 
collected by the department under Section 64-13-21, if applicable; and 
(b) second, if applicable, to the cost of obtaining a DNA specimen under 
Subsection (3). 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 12, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 140, § 13, eff. July 
1, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 2, eff. 




U.C.A. 1953 § 7 7 - 3 8 a - 5 0 1 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
KM Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*i Part 5. Enforcement and Collection 
-•§ 77-38a-501. Default and sanctions 
(1) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a judgment for restitution or any 
installment ordered, the court, on motion of the prosecutor, parole or probation 
agent, victim, or on its own motion may impose sanctions against the defendant as 
provided in Section 76-3-201.1. 
(2) The court may not impose a sanction against the defendant under Subsection 
(1) if: 
(a) the defendant's sole default in the payment of a judgement for restitution is 
the failure to pay restitution ordered under Subsection 76-3-201(6) regarding 
costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility; and 
(b) the sanction would extend the defendant's term of probation or parole. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 13, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 14, eff. May 6, 
2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Sentencing and Punishment C=>2217. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2217. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-501, UT ST § 77-38a-501 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-502 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*ii Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*ii Part 5. Enforcement and Collection 
-f§ 77-38a-502. Collection from inmate offenders 
In addition to the remedies provided in Section 77-38a-501, the department upon 
written request of the prosecutor, victim, or parole or probation agent, shall 
collect restitution from offender funds held by the department as provided in 
Section 64-13-23. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 14, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Convicts €^>7 (1) . 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 98k7(1). 
C.J.S. Convicts §§ 13 to 15. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-502, UT ST § 77-38a-502 
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*H Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*& Part 6. Preservation of Assets 
•+§ 77-38a-601. Preservation of assets 
(1) At the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, or a 
petition alleging delinquency is filed, or at any time during the prosecution of 
the case, a prosecutor may petition the court to enter a restraining order or 
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any 
other action to preserve the availability of property which may be necessary to 
satisfy an anticipated restitution order if, in the prosecutor's best judgement, 
there is a substantial likelihood that a conviction will be obtained and 
restitution will be ordered. 
(a) Upon receiving a petition from a prosecutor under this Subsection (1), and 
after notice and a hearing, the court may enter a restraining order or 
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any 
action necessary to preserve the availability of property which may be necessary 
to satisfy an anticipated restitution order. 
(b) An order entered under this Subsection (1) is effective for up to 90 days, 
unless extended by the court for good cause shown. 
(2) Prior to the filing of a criminal information, indictment charging a 
violation, or a petition alleging delinquency, a prosecutor may petition the court 
to enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a 
satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the 
availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated 
restitution order if, in the prosecutor's best judgement, there is a substantial 
likelihood that a conviction will be obtained and restitution will be ordered. 
(a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under this Subsection (2), the 
court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a 
satisfactory performance bond, or take any action necessary to preserve the 
availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated 
restitution order after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the 
property and affording them an opportunity to be heard, if the court determines 
that: 
(i) there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that 
the defendant committed it, and that failure to enter the order will result in 
the property being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or removed from the 
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made unavailable for restitution; and 
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(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property or prevent its sale, 
distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal through the entry of the 
requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is 
to be entered. 
(b) An order entered under this Subsection (2) is effective for the period of 
time given in the order. 
(3) (a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under Subsection (2) , and 
notwithstanding Subsection (2) (a) (i) , a court may enter a temporary restraining 
order against an owner with respect to specific property without notice or 
opportunity for a hearing if: 
(i) the prosecutor demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood that the 
property with respect to which the order is sought appears to be necessary to 
satisfy an anticipated restitution order under this chapter; and 
(ii) that provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the property 
to satisfy any restitution order or judgment. 
(b) The temporary order in this Subsection (3) expires not more than ten days 
after it is entered unless extended for good cause shown or the party against 
whom it is entered consents to an extension. 
(4) A hearing concerning an order entered under this section shall be held as soon 
as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order. 
Laws 2004, c. 160, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
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Recent developments in Utah law: I. Criminal law and procedure. The recent 
legislative developments section consists of brief expositions of selected 
statutes enacted by the 2004 Utah Legislature. 2005 Utah L. Rev. 341 (2005). 
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